employee
Grozny, Grozny, Russian Federation
UDC 338.28
Introduction. The key problem in assessing the tax audits efficiency is that their effectiveness in curbing the shadow economy growth is offset by the fact that they are less impactful in facilitating the transition to formal activities. Therefore, it is necessary to search for new key indicators to measure the effectiveness of tax authorities activity in facilitating formalisation, taking into account the models of “enforcement” and “voluntary consent” of taxpayers’ behaviour. Methods. A comparative analysis in the context of the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development is used in the research in terms of evaluating the efficiency of existing tax control instruments. Results. The probability of revealing the facts of the informal economy participation increases not only the control of employees, but also the forms of mandatory business registration and licensing. It is proved that voluntary compliance is achieved through indirect control tools and is considered as a derivative of the state efficiency level. Enforcement is implemented through a control mechanism, which requires the government to use advanced informational-analytical technologies such as artificial intellect and big data in tax control procedures more active. Modern approaches to combat informal employment should integrate coercive and incentive measures into a single system of shadow activity counteraction. Various types of sanctions should be used to increase the real or expected costs of the informal economy participating and to deter its growth. Thus, the combination of direct and indirect instruments is the most effective means of encouraging the economic relations formalisation. At the same time, when the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions is minimal, deterrence measures have little effect on the dynamics of informal employment, and vice versa, when the disparity between institutions increases, the level of deterrent factors has a decisive impact.
informal employment, tax control, tax evasion, shadow economy, tax audits
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